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Leave to Amend Pleadings is Not an Absolute Right

By Sebastian di Domenico

In McFadden v. Psutka, 2024 ONCA 203 (CanLII), the Ontario Court of Appeal addressed an appeal from the dismissal of the appellants’ motion for leave to amend their claim.

This case arises from alleged negligent treatment provided by the respondent, Dr. David J. Psutka.

The motion judge had dismissed the appellants’ motion to amend their claim. The dismissal was based on the finding that the purported amendments constituted new claims, which were barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B. Additionally, the motion judge found that allowing the amendments would have resulted in prejudice that could not be compensated by costs or an adjournment.

The Applicable Test

The Ontario Court of Appeal referred to Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that courts shall grant leave to amend a pleading on such terms as are just, unless prejudice would result which could not be compensated for by costs or an adjournment.

The Court further noted that “although the general rule is that amendments are presumptively approved, there is no absolute right to amend pleadings. The court has a residual right to deny amendments where appropriate.”[1]

The Positions of the Parties

The appellants argued that Dr. Psutka had not provided evidence of actual prejudice and that the amendments were simply the particulars of existing allegations.

The respondent argued that the amendments fundamentally changed the nature of the claim.

Disposition

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal with costs fixed in the amount of $15,000 all-inclusive. It held that there was no error in the motion judge’s conclusion that the amendments created a new claim and that there would be prejudice, as the new claim was statute barred.

In reaching the above conclusion, the Court of Appeal considered the following:

  • A motion judge’s finding that amendments constitute a new claim is a legal determination, which is subject to the standard of correctness on appeal.
  • A motion judge’s finding that the new claim would be statute barred due to the Limitations Act, therefore resulting in actual prejudice, is a finding of mixed fact and law, and so a palpable and overriding error is required for appellate intervention.
  • Here, the motion judge had found that the proposed amendments to the claim would fundamentally change the factual matrix pled to conform with a new expert opinion, which constituted a new claim that was statute barred by the Limitations Act. The Court of Appeal found no reason to interfere with this conclusion.

Takeaway

The takeaway from this decision is that plaintiffs are not always allowed to amend a pleading. In cases where there is prejudice that cannot be addressed through costs or an adjournment, such as when the amendments create a new claim that is statute barred, then plaintiffs will be stuck with their initial pleading.


[1] Marks v. Ottawa (City), 2011 ONCA 248, 280 O.A.C. 251, at para. 19.